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THE PRIVILEGE OF EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION
AND MINORITY UNION RIGHTS
IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Recognition of a union as the exclusive representative' of all employees in a governmental unit is provided by a majority of state statutes
authorizing collective bargaining in public employment, 2 as well as by
1 Exclusive recognition means that a union designated or selected as the collective
bargaining representative by a majority of the employees in a particular bargaining unit
shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit, without regard to
their membership or nonmembership in that union. See MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 178F(2)
(Supp. 1969). Compare Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(a), 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964), with Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
2 The statutory authorization for collective bargaining may be directed at public
employees generally or at specific units of state employees, municipal employees, public
school personnel, or fire and police department personnel. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468
(b) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); id. §§ 10-153b(a), (c) (teachers); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 1306 (Supp. 1968) (public employees); id. tit. 16, § 4004 (BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE
REL. RaP. No. 322, F-1 (Nov. 10, 1969)) (teachers); Ch. 791, § 4, [1969] Fla. Laws (I CCH
47,204 (Nov. 21, 1969)) (firefighters); ME. REv. STAT.
LAB. L. REP.-STATE LAws, Fla.
ANN. tit. 26, § 967(2) (Supp. 1970) (municipal employees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, §§ 160(d),
(e)(5) (1957) (teachers); BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 1, §§ 115, 117(c) (BNA GOv'T
EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 266, E-4 to -5 (Oct. 14, 1968)) (municipal employees); MAss. ANN.
LAWs ch. 149, § 178F(2) (Supp. 1969) (state employees); id. §§ 178H(l), (3) (municipal
employees); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(11) (1968) (public employees); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 105.500(2) (Supp. 1969) (public employees); MONT. REV. CODaS ANN. §§ 41-2205 to -2206(2)
(Supp. 1969) (nurses); Ch. 650, § 11(2), [1969] Nev. Stat. 1378 (municipal employees); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:3(I) (Supp. 1969) (state employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3
(Supp. 1969) (public employees); NEw YORK CITY, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 54, § 1173-3.0()
(2 CCH LAB. L. REP.-STATE LAWS, N.Y. 47,450.08 (March 15, 1968)) (municipal employees);
Ch. 579, § 5(1), [1969] Ore. Laws (4A BNA LAB. REL. Ra'. 47:234b (Oct. 27, 1969)) (public
employees); Ch. 647, [1969] Ore. Laws (4A BNA LAB. REL. RaP. 47:244 (Aug. 18, 1969))
(teachers); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 342.460(1), (5) (1969); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9.1-5
(1968) (firefighters); id. § 28-9.2-5 (policemen); id. §§ 28-9.3-3 to -5 (teachers); id. § 28-9.4-4
(municipal employees); id. §§ 28-7-14, 36-11-6 (1969) (state employees); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 16, § 1991(a) (Supp. 1969) (teachers); id. tit. 3, § 941(h) (state employees); id. tit. 21,
§§ 1583, 1703 (municipal employees); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 28.72.030, 28.72.040 (Supp.
1969) (teachers); id. § 41.56.080 (public employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.83(1)
(Supp. 1969) (state employees); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-267 (1967) (firefighters). Several of
these provisions for exclusive recognition have survived recent constitutional challenges.
See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Municipal Employees Local 812 (Md.
Cir. Ct. 1969), in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. RE.. No. 285, B-4 (Feb. 24, 1969); State
ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969); Lullo v. International Ass'n
of Fire Fighters, 55 N.J. 409, 262 A.2d 681 (1970). A bill presently under consideration
by the Hawaii legislature would require exclusive recognition for the majority representative of state and county employees. BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE PEL. REP. No. 347, B-10
(May 4, 1970).
Absent legislation enabling a public employer to bargain collectively with an organization representing his employees, a public employer may engage in such bargaining
but may not confer exclusive recognition on the employee organization. E.g., State Bd.
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Executive Order No. 11491 covering federal employees.3 Other public
employment statutes merely require a majority union to represent
the employment interests of employees in the bargaining unit; 4 on occasion, however, courts 5 and administrative agencies 6 have interpreted
these provisions to authorize exclusive recognition. Only two states
have statutes specifically prohibiting exclusive recognition; 7 the remain8
ing state laws do not define representational status although state

9
courts have attempted to define the scope of permissible recognition.
The right of exclusive recognition is expressly granted in the
private sector by federal and state legislation. 10 The advantages and

of Regents v. United Packing House Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970). But see
Chicago Div. of 111. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966).
3 Exec. Order No. 11491, § 10(a), 34 Fed. Reg. 17609 (1969). Over one-half of the
federal work force is represented by unions having exclusive recognition. BNA Gov'T
EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 314, E-1 to -4 (Sept. 15, 1969).
4 Los ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., EMPLOYEE RELATIONS ORDINANCE § 9 (BNA Gov'T
EMPLOYEE REL. REIP. No. 261, F-5 (Sept. 9, 1968)) (county employees); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 179.52(3) (1966) (public employees); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1290 (Supp. 1967) (teachers);
N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw §§ 204, 206-08 (McKinney Supp. 1969) (public employees); NID.
CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-11 (Supp. 1969) (teachers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Supp.
1969) (firefighters & policemen); Ch. 88, § 7.3, [1969] S.D. Laws 156 (public employees);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees).
5 E.g., Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969).
6 E.g., N.Y. Public Employment Rels. Bd., Rules and Regulations, § 201.11(h) (2
47,427.11 (Oct. 17, 1969)) (adopted pursuant to
CCH LAB. L. REP.-STATE LAWS, N.Y.
N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 206.1 (McKinney Supp. 1969)).
7 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-88 (West 1969) (teachers); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 125.22(3)
(Supp. 1970) (teachers).
8 ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 317(3) (Supp. 1969) (teachers & municipal employees); id. tit.
37, § 450(3) (firefighters); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 23.40.010 to .040 (Supp. 1969) (public employees);
CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1960-63 (West Supp. 1970) (firefighters); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221
(1965) (public employees); HAWAII REv. LAWS §§ 76-101 to -102 (1968) (public employees);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 751-53 (Supp. 1970) (state employees); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 48-801 to -818 (1968), as amended in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 295, F-i
to -3 (May 5, 1969) (public employees); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (Supp. 1967) (town
employees); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-11-01 to -05 (1960) (public employees); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, §§ 215.1 to .5 (1964) (public employees).
One statute implies that only unanimous union membership of unit employees is
the basis for exclusive representation. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3502, 3503 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1970) (public employees, including firefighters pursuant to id. § 3501(d) (West Supp.
1970)).
9 See, e.g., Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union, 108 N.H. 416, 237 A.2d 668 (1968)
(validating city ordinance enacted pursuant to N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (Supp. 1967)
under which city contracted with exclusively recognized union). Contra, Dade County
Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969) (holding that the majority
union, a teachers' association, may not act as exclusive representative and sole collective
bargaining agent for all teachers in a school system where not all teachers have so agreed).
10 E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 705 (McKinney 1965); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.05(1) (1957).
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practical considerations that have marked the success of exclusive
recognition in providing effective employee representation in private
employment support extension of the policy to the public sector.,- To
the extent that exclusive recognition is adopted in public employment,
however, there is a commensurate diminution in the freedom of individual employees and of organizations representing a minority of employees in a governmental unit.1 Because, upon adoption of an exclusive recognition policy, the state will be acting not only in its traditional
regulatory role, but also as an employer, a zone of protection for the
organizational and representational rights of the members of a minority
organization should be cautiously formulated.' 3 The alternative could
be the unnecessary, unjust, and perhaps unconstitutional subversion of
individual employee and minority union rights in public employment.
In assessing the principle of exclusivity in public employment, it
11 Exclusive recognition status may benefit the public employer and the unit employees by promoting greater stability in the employment relationship, greater union
responsibility, and more orderly representation of public employees. See Oberer, The
Future of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 20 LAB. L.J. 777, 781 (1969);
Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A
Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. RKv. 891, 901-02 (1969); BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL.
REP. No. 323, A-6 (Nov. 17, 1969) (statement of Secretary of Labor Shultz). It is apparent
that exclusivity in bargaining for all employees in a given unit is necessary in order that
the bargaining process be viable. One group can most successfully perform the bargaining
function for the unit employees; a multiplicity of bargaining agents could result, in
effect, in negotiating anarchy. The merits of a system of exclusive recognition for public
employment are reviewed in: Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARv. L.
REv. 391, 400-01 (1961); Note, Municipal Employment Relations in Wisconsin: The
Extension of Private Labor Relations Devices into Municipal Employment, 1965 Wis.
L. REV. 671, 672-73. Problems that could result from recognition of competing organizations for the purposes of collective bargaining would be extremely acute in public
employment where the public employer needs reasonable assurances that agreement on
economic matters may be reached before the budgetary deadline prescribed by law.
See R. DOHERTY & W. OBERER, TEAcHERs, SCHOOL BoARDs, AND CoLLECTIvE BARGAINING:
A CHA-NGING OF THE GuARD 78 (1967).
The provision for exclusive recognition is seldom debated and remains largely
unlitigated; deference has been shown to the legitimacy of this concept in litigation
concerning the corollary duty to represent all employees, whether or not they are members
of the union acting as exclusive representative. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967);
Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 75-76, 190 A.2d 825, 832-33 (1963).
12 Apart from the general diminution in the power of a minority union to function
as labor relations representative of some employees, diminution of minority union
power may severely affect the ability of black workers to protect a racial minority from
alleged discriminatory practices on the part of a majority representative. See BNA Gov'r
EMPLOYEE RE . REP. No. 314, B-17 (Sept. 15, 1969) (reporting the frustrating attempt
of a minority union of black firemen to gain recognition in the District of Columbia
where the majority union has 1,490 members, only a fraction of whom are black).
1 See Eisner, First Amendment Right of Association for Public Employee Union
Members, 20 LAB. L.J. 438, 442 (1969).
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is necessary to delineate those privileges granted the majority union
that may be denied the minority organization, and, conversely, those in
which the minority must share. On the one hand are those privileges
directly related to the exclusive collective bargaining function of the
majority union; on the other are those merely related to the continuing
campaign of the exclusive representative to maintain its majority status
and to defeat challenges in subsequent decertification proceedings.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Of critical importance in preserving the rights of minority union
members, as well as those of the individual public employee, is the
adoption of constitutional means to achieve and foster exclusive recognition. The rights of a minority union should initially be measured
against the first amendment rights to speak freely, to assemble peaceably, to petition, 14 and to associate, 15 guaranteed against infringement' 6
by either the federal or state governments.17 For example, the exclusive
status of the recognized union for the purposes of bargaining and executing an agreement with the public employer cannot constitutionally
prevent an individual employee, or an association of employees comprising a minority union, from petitioning the public employer about
grievances 18 arising from the employment relationship. 19 The freedom
of individual employees or employees organized into a minority union
to speak out on subjects concerning the employment relationship is
14 U.S. CoNsr. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
15 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 n.7 (1967); AFSCME v. Woodward, 406
F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1968).
16 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967) (rejecting the principle
of "balancing" first amendment rights and taking the position that legislation should
be drawn narrowly enough to avoid conflicts betwedn legislative power and individual
rights).
17 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945).
18 See U.S. CONST. amend. I and the state constitutional counterparts; eg., CONN. CONST.
art. 1, § 14; MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. 19; MIcH. CONsr. art. 1, § 3; N.Y. CONSr. art. 1,
§ 9; WIs. CoNsT. art. 1, § 4.
19 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), which held that the "grievances for
redress of which the right of petition was insured" are not confined to religious or political
causes, but include other fields of human interests including business or economic activity.
Id. at 531.
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protected.2 0

also constitutionally
Exclusive recognition, as this concept
is applied by a majority of public employment laws, 21 does not, per se,
inhibit public employees in the exercise of their right to form, join,22
assist, 28 or participate in 24 any labor organization whether or not it
constitutes a minority or majority organization. 25 Therefore, so long as
Besides providing a constitutional protection for the right to petition (N.J. CONST.
art. 1,
18) similar to that found in the United States Constitution, the New Jersey
constitution embodies a more specific guarantee for public employees: "Persons in public
employment shall have the right to organize, present to and make known to the State,
or any of its political subdivisions or agencies, their grievances and proposals through
representatives of their own choosing." Id.
19. See Lullo v. International Ass'n
of Fire Fighters, 55 NJ. 409, 262 A.2d 681 (1970) (holding that exclusive recognition
is not inconsistent with NJ. CoNsr. art. 1,
19).
20 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 291 U.S. 563 (1968).
21 See notes 1-9 and accompanying text supra.
22 The right to form and join a labor organization is guaranteed in: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 10-153a (1967) (teachers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1302 (Supp. 1968) (public
employees); id. tit. 14, § 4003(a) (BNA GovT EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 322, F-1 (Nov. 10,
1969)) (teachers); Ch. 791, § 2, [1969] Fla. Laws (I CCH LAB. L. REP.-STATE LAws, Fla.
47,200 (Nov. 11, 1969)) (firefighters); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.52(2) (1966) (public employees); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 105.510 (Supp. 1969) (public employees); Ch. 650, §9(l), [1969]
Nev. Stat. 1376 (municipal employees); R.L. GEN. LAws. ANN. §§ 28-9.3-1, 28-9.3-6 (1968)
(applying the guarantees of id. §§ 28-7-12 to -13) (teachers); id. § 28-9.4-1 (municipal
employees); Ch. 88, § 7.2, [1969] S.D. Laws 154 (public employees); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.70(2) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees).
23 The right to form, join, and assist a labor organization is guaranteed in: Exec.
Order No. 11491, § 3(a), 34 Fed. Reg. 17605 (1969); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468(a)
(Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); BALTIMORE, MD., CrrY CODE art. I, § 113 (BNA Gov'T
EMILoYEE REL. REP. No. 266, E4 (Oct. 14, 1968)) (municipal employees); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 149, § 178D (Supp. 1969) (public employees); id. § 178F(2) (state employees);
id. § 178H(1) (municipal employees); MicIr. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(9) (1968) (public employees);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:2 (Supp. 1969) (state employees); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3
(Supp. 1969) (public employees); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-7-12 (1968) (private employees,
applicable to state employees, firefighters, and policemen pursuant to id. § 36-11-6 (Supp.
1967)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1982(a) (Supp. 1969) (teachers); id. tit. 3, § 903(a) (state
employees); id. tit. 21, § 1703 (applying id. tit. 21, § 1503 to municipal employees); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 111.82 (Supp. 1969) (state employees).
24 The right to form, join, and participate in a labor organization is guaranteed
in: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 963 (Supp. 1970) (municipal employees); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 77, § 160(b) (1969) (teachers); BALTIMORE, MD., Crry CODE art. 1, § 113 (BNA Gov'T
EMPLOYEE Rx. REP. No. 266, E-4 (Oct. 14, 1968)) (municipal employees); NEB. Rxv.
STAT. § 79-1288 (Supp. 1967) (public school employees); N.Y. Cv. Smv. LAw § 202 (McKinney Supp. 1969) (public employees); NJD. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-07(1) (Supp. 1969)
(teachers & administrators); ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.730(l) (1963), as amended, ch. 579,
[1969] Ore. Laws (4A BNA LAB. REL. RIP. 47:234a (Oct. 27, 1969)) (public employees);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1982(a) (Supp. 1969) (teachers).
25 Public employee bargaining laws authorizing exclusive recognition may also
protect the right of the public employee to refrain from forming, joining, assisting, or
participating in any labor organization: Los AN.ELES COuNTY, CAL., EMPLoYEE RELATIoNs
OPINANcE § 4 (BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 261, F-1 (Sept. 9, 1968)) (county
employees); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153a (1967) (teachers); MD. ANN. CODE art. 77,
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no agreement between the government employer and exclusive representative restricts an individual public employee in the exercise of
these rights, the constitutional guarantees will not be infringed.
The rights of the individual public employee or his minority union
should also be measured against the due process and equal protection
requirements of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.2

6

Since

exclusivity in bargaining for an entire unit of public employees is essential if the bargaining process is to remain viable, 27 the requirements
of due process are satisfied: the privilege of exclusivity is reasonably
related to the attainment of a permissible objective-stable labor relations in public employment. 28 Similarly, there is a reasonable equal
protection basis for classifying the majority union as the exclusive
29
representative.
But what of the conduct of the parties to the exclusive relationship? Even if an individual employee refuses to join the exclusively
recognized union, he is constitutionally entitled to representation by
that union without discrimination and without regard to his nonmembership.30 Exclusive recognition and a collective bargaining contract
made pursuant thereto inevitably involve constraints on the individual
employee and on the influence and power of a minority organization,3 1
but these constraints must be reasonably related to the policies supporting the grant of exclusive status. Although it is difficult to mark
§ 160(c) (1969) (public school employees);

BALTIhiORE, MD., Crry CODE art. 1, § 118 (BNA
Gov'T EMpLOYEE Rn,. REP. No. 226, E4 (Oct. 14, 1968)) (municipal employees); MAss.
ANN. lAWs ch. 149, § 178D (Supp. 1969) (state employees); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 179.52(2)
(1966) (public employees); Nm. REv. STAT. § 79-1288 (Supp. 1967) (public school employees);
Ch. 650, § 9(1), [1969] Nev. Stat. 1877 (municipal employees); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 98-C:2 (Supp. 1969) (state employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 84:18A-5.3 (Supp. 1969) (public
employees); N.Y. Civ. Stav. L iv § 202 (McKinney Supp. 1969) (public employees); ND.
CENT. CODE § 15-88.1-07(2) (Supp. 1969) (teachers & administrators); RJ. GEN. LAws
ANN. § 28-9.8-7 (1968) (teachers); id. § 28-9.4-8 (municipal employees); id. § 86-11-2
(1969) (state employees); Ch. 88, § 7.2, [1969] S.D. Laws 156 (public employees); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 1982(a) (Supp. 1969) (teachers); id. tit. 8, § 908(a) (state employees); id.
tit. 21, § 1703 (applying id. tit. 21, § 1503 to municipal employees); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.70(2) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); id. § 111.82 (state employees). Accord,
Exec. Order No. 11491, § 1(a), 84 Fed. Reg. 17605 (1969).
26 "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
27 See note 11 supra.
28 See Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 851 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1956); cf. Virginian
Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 800 U.S. 515, 558-59 (1987).
29 Cf. Baxstrom v. Herold, 888 U.S. 107, 111 (1966); Morey v. Doud, 854 U.S. 457,
465 (1957).
30 See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 823 U.S. 192, 202-08 (1944).
31 Cf. id. at 203.
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precisely the constitutional limits on differences in the treatment of
the exclusive and minority representatives by the public employer (acting either unilaterally or bilaterally with the recognized union),3 2 two
examples of fourteenth amendment limitations on the rights of the
exclusive representative are appropriate.33
Pursuant to an agreement with a public employer, an exclusive
representative might be granted the sole right to use the employer's
bulletin boards, internal mail system, and auditoriums for meetings.3 4
When measured against the requirement that benefits granted the
exclusive representative must be reasonably based in the policy of fostering stable labor relations in public employment, discrimination by
a government in permitting the use of these facilities may be circumscribed by the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.3 5 A check-off provision negotiated by the exclusive representative
may be a valid way to promote the financial security and stability of the
exclusive representative. 0 But it may be argued that the collective
bargaining process is not strengthened by denying the minority union
a corresponding privilege of check-off; the exclusive check-off merely
32 For a more detailed analysis of the correlative rights of minority and exclusive
representatives, see text at notes 38-145 infra.
SS The same protections guaranteed a minority union under the fourteenth amendment where an exclusive representative has been recognized pursuant to state law are
guaranteed a minority union subject to the provisions of Exec. Order No. 11491,
34 Fed. Reg. 17605 (1969), by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
34 See BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. RE'. No. 294, B-9 (April 28, 1969) (reporting the
initiation of a suit by the Denver Federation of Teachers challenging the constitutionality
of the sole right to the use of school premises and facilities granted the exclusive representative, the Denver Classroom Teachers Association).
35 See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
In Yeager, the Supreme Court held that the state may not be required to provide avenues
of appellate review; but that, if they are provided, access must be granted to all persons
equally. 384 U.S. at 310-11. In Brown, the Court stated in regard to the use of a public
library: "A State or its instrumentality may, of course, regulate the use of its libraries
or other public facilities. But it must do so in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner,
equally applicable to all and administered with equality to all." 383 U.S. at 143. Referring
to Brown, the New York Court of Appeals has declared that under the fourteenth amendment:
The State is not under a duty to make school buildings available for public
gatherings .... [But] defendant has concededly allowed a number of organizations,
including the very plaintiff before us, to use the school auditorium for nonacademic
purposes for many years. It follows, therefore, that, in deciding who is to be permitted to use its school, the board must not unconstitutionally discriminate against
the plaintiff.
East Meadow v. Board of Educ., 18 N.Y.2d 129, 133-34, 219 N.E.2d 172, 174, 272 N.Y.S.2d
341, 344-45 (1966).
36 Bauch v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 606-07, 237 N.E2d 211, 213-14, 289
N.Y.S.2d 951, 954-56, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968).
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hinders the operations of the minority union without protecting the
majority union in its role as exclusive representative. Because an exclusive check-off granted by a public employer bears no reasonable relation
to improving the capacity of the exclusive representative to fulfill its
collective bargaining role, it could be prohibited by the fourteenth
37
amendment.
Thus, a program of exclusive recognition of the majority union
does not, per se, deprive individual employees or minority union members of their constitutional rights. But to ignore the differences between
the exclusive bargaining role of the recognized union and the role of
that union as a rival to a minority competitor may subject the minority
union and the individual employee to unequal treatment prohibited
by the fourteenth amendment. What needs to be considered, then, are
the relative rights to be accorded the exclusive and minority unions in
a viable labor relations framework for public employment.
II
A POLICY FOR MINORITY UNION RIGHTS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

Application of a system of exclusive recognition to labor relations
in the public sector raises the question of the extent to which a majority
union should be granted exclusivity. Specifically, how secure should the
exclusive representative be with regard to its representational status,
access to the public employer's premises, collective bargaining, and
subjects related thereto?
A.

Collective Bargaining

Under the federal executive order, 38 and under most state laws,3 9
equal treatment of a minority organization in all respects is not required after the majority representative has been exclusively recognized.
By definition, a grant of exclusive recognition to one union precludes a minority representative from negotiating a labor agreement on
49
behalf of any employees in the particular government bargaining unit.

37 See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 16-18, 26-28, Bauch v. City of New York,
393 U.S. 834 (1968).
38 Exec. Order No. 11491, §§ 7(c), 10(e), 14, 19(d), 20, 21(a), 84 Fed. Reg. 17608-14
(1969).
39 See Mihvaukee Bd. of School Dirs., Decision No. 6833-A, at 7 (W.E.R.B.
March 24, 1966) (decision of Wisconsin Employment Relations Board), rev'd in part sub.
nom. Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.V.2d 92 (1969); notes 2-9
and accompanying text supra.
40 See note 1 supra.
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The public employer is also obligated to refrain from negotiating the
terms and conditions of employment with individual employees. 4 ' Of
course, adequate guarantees must be provided the individual public
employee, including a requirement that representation for purposes of
collective bargaining be on behalf of all employees in the unit, without
discrimination and without regard to membership in the majority
42
union.
Just as the minority union or individual employee is prevented
from bargaining with the public employer, the recognition of an exclusive representative raises a collateral obligation on the part of the
employer to refrain from acting in violation of the exclusive representative's collective bargaining rights. Thus, upon the insistence of
the exclusive representative, a public employer must cease dealing
with and implementing contract provisions negotiated by a union that
loses a representation election. 43 Furthermore, the public employer
may take no affirmative action having as its object the diminution of
the exclusive representative's majority status or effectiveness. 44
41 See, e.g., 1 PERB
1-536 (April 16, 1968) (opinion of counsel); id.
1-543
(May 6, 1968); id. 1-549 (June 26, 1968). PERB (Public Employment Relations Board)
is the agency that administers New York's Taylor Law. N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW § 205
(McKinney Supp. 1969).
42 See Exec. Order No. 11491, § 10(e), 34 Fed. Reg. 17610 (1969); 1 PERB
1-568
(Jan. 7, 1969) (opinion of counsel); note 1 supra.
43 See, e.g., Melvindale-N. Allen Park School Dist. (Melvindale Fed'n of Teachers),
1967 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. 167. In the Melvindale case, it was held that a school district could
not continue an agreement previously in effect with the now-minority union. Pursuant to
that agreement the school district had been contributing money at the request of its
employees to an insurance plan that required as a condition of coverage employee membership in the now-minority union, even though under the arrangement the employees
could choose an alternate insurer or receipt of a cash equivalent of the insurance contribution. In an opinion affirmed by the Michigan Labor Mediation Board, the trial examiner
reasoned that the operation of this arrangement in effect promoted a type of proportional
representation system in which each of the competing organizations bargained for and
represented its own segment of the unit:
Such an arrangement is inimical to the principal [sic] of exclusive bargaining
agents which is written into the Act [MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(11) (1968)]. Loss
of a representation election does not mean the losing organization must disband,
but it does mean that the employer must cease dealing with the organization in
matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment, and must accord to
the winning organization the status of bargaining representative of all the
employees within the unit. Where the exclusive agent opposes including its vanquished opponent's insurance plan in the fringe benefit program, it is entitled to
insist that any such tie with the losing organization cease.
Id. at 174 (emphasis in original).
44 See City of Detroit (Detroit City Hosp. Employees), 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. 798,
801; Oswego Chapter, CSEA, 2 PERB 2-6076 (March 4, 1969) (fact finding).
The Michigan Labor Mediation Board in the Detroit case affirmed the trial examiner's
decision that once a rival union was designated the exclusive (majority) representative
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The determination of what constitutes collective bargaining for
the purpose of reaching an agreement between an employer and. the
recognized exclusive representative presents unique problems in public
employment. For example, state "anti-secrecy" laws may forbid formal
action of any kind to be introduced, deliberated upon, or adopted at
any dosed executive session or dosed meeting of any state or local
governing body. 45 An exception may be made, however, for the closed
negotiation of a proposed agreement between a labor organization and
46
an agent of the government employer.
When a labor agreement bargained for in private is submitted for
ratification to the governing body sitting in open session, a problem
arises as to the rights of a minority union or individual employee before that body. This issue was raised under the Wisconsin statute governing labor relations in municipal employment 47 in a case involving
the Milwaukee school district. 48 Pursuant to the results of an election
in 1964, the Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association (MTEA) was
designated the exclusive collective bargaining representative by the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (WERB). 49 After the board of
school directors had entered into contract discussions with the MTEA,
a teacher, acting as a representative of the minority Milwaukee Teachers' Union (MTU), was denied an opportunity to speak on negotiable
matters at the public meeting of a committee of the school board. Because representatives of groups other than the MTU had been permitted to speak on such matters at the meeting, 50 the union filed a
following an election lost by the incumbent representative, the incumbent union could
no longer insist upon arbitrating numerous grievances filed prior to its loss of the representation election. Because the incumbent union's right to speak for a group of employees
was dependent on its status as exclusive bargaining agent, its privilege ceased entirely
when it was defeated. Since the newly-elected representative supplanted the incumbent
union in presenting the grievances pending for arbitration, the case was distinguished from
John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). The trial examiner observed that:
"To hold otherwise would be to deprive the new union of its immediate right to be the
exclusive spokesman for all unit employees on every matter affecting wages or conditions
of employment." 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. at 803.
45 E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 14.90 (Supp. 1969). Such statutes are also known as "government-in-the-sunshine" laws. See Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 472
(Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
46 See 54 Op. Arr'y GEN. Wis., at vi (1965).
47 VIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (Supp. 1969).
48 Milwaukee Teachers Union, Decision No. 6995-A, at 12-13 (W.E.R.B. March 24,
1966), rev'd in part sub nom. Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d
92 (1969).
49 WERB was redesignated the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC)
as of August 1, 1967, and will be cited hereinafter as WERB or WERC where appropriate.
50 Milwaukee Teachers Union, Decision No. 6995-A, at 3 (W.E.R.B. March 24, 1966),
rev'd in part sub nom. Board of School Dirs. v. WEP-C, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92
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complaint against the school directors with WERB5 1 The Board determined that the denial of the right to speak was unlawful 52 and ordered
the school directors to cease and desist from depriving any member or
representative of an employee organization of the opportunity to be
''5
heard "at any public meeting held for any purpose. 3
In support of its decision the Board adopted the position that a
public hearing is not a forum for collective bargaining in public
employment.5 4 Thus, an appearance by a representative of the minority
union at a public hearing was not equated with an attempt at collective
bargaining even though the hearing agenda involved negotiable subjects; the concept of collective bargaining in public employment was
restricted to the "give and take" relationship between the public employer and the exclusive representative "across the 'bargaining table.' "5
WERB's decision on this point was reversed on appeal by a circuit
court,5 6 and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the reversal in
Board of School Directors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.57 In its opinion, the supreme court concluded that the public
employer engages in prohibited collective bargaining whenever it permits a representative of a minority union to speak on negotiable subjects during a private or public negotiation session.58 Contrary to the
decision of WERB, the court held that the collective bargaining process
(1969). The teacher, acting as the minority union representative, was denied the right
to speak pursuant to procedural rules agreed to by the school directors and the MTEA.
The board's committee chairman indicated that the teacher could speak on negotiable
subjects only as an individual, but not as the representative of the minority union. The
teacher declined to speak as an individual.
51 Milwaukee Teachers Union, Decision No. 6995-A, at 1 (W.E.R.B. March 24, 1966).
The complaint alleged a violation of Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(3)(a)(1) (Supp. 1969)
which prohibits the employer practice of unlawfully interfering with, restraining, and
coercing its employees in the exercise of their § 111.70(2) rights "to affiliate with labor
organizations of their own choosing." Decision No. 6995-A, at 7.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 8.
54 Id. at 17 (memorandum accompanying WERB's findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and order).
55 Id.
56 Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 643-44, 651, 168 N.W.2d 92, 95,
98-99 (1969).
57 Id. at 654, 168 N.W.2d at 100. The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Board of
School Directors culminated the litigation begun in Milwaukee Teachers Union. All the
issues presented in the WERB decision were not presented to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court for review. Id. at 642 n.3, 168 N.W.2d at 94 n.3.
58 Id. at 651-54, 168 N.W.2d at 99-100. But see Appellant's Brief in Support of Motion
for Rehearing at 7-8, Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92
(1969) (WERC argued that it is not unlawful to negotiate with a minority union.)
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includes the open hearing required by the anti-secrecy law, at which
the governing body acts on the agreement negotiated between its agent
and the exclusive representative.5 9
The policy expressed by the court is premised on recognition of
the majority union as the sole representative for collective bargaining.
According to the court, where public affirmation by a governmental
body is needed to finalize a collective bargaining contract, bargaining
continues until that affirmation takes place. Therefore, permitting the
minority union to express its views on negotiable subjects during what
amounts to a negotiating session would defeat the purpose of designating the majority union as exclusive bargaining representative.
An appearance at a mandatory public meeting, however, is hardly
the negotiation of wages and conditions of employment. The negotiation of the agreement has taken place in private without the interference of any minority unions, dissenting employees, or other interest
groups. Formal negotiations between the public employer and the exclusive representative have terminated, at least temporarily. The antisecrecy law, requiring the public hearing on the agreement, does not
contemplate negotiation or discussion between the public employer
and the majority union, a minority union, any other group, or an individual employee. The minority union may well intend to influence
the public employer by stating its position regarding wages, hours, and
working conditions, but the public employer is under no obligation to
reply to or treat with the minority organization. The privilege accorded
the minority union would be no stronger than that expressed in the
basic right "to assemble, and to petition the Government" guaranteed
by the first amendment of the Federal Constitution and article 1, section 4, of the Wisconsin constitution. 60
The anti-secrecy law operated, in this case, to permit individual
employees and interested groups to attempt to influence the public employer by speaking on negotiable subjects during the public hearings.
To deny only the minority union the right to appear and speak before
a public meeting of the governmental body precludes public comment
by an organization with a real and immediate stake in the outcome of
the deliberations; it also thwarts the policy, as expressed in the antisecrecy law, of public access "to the fullest and most complete informa59 42 Wis. 2d at 652-54, 168 N.W.2d at 99-100. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 14.90 (Supp.
1969), with 54 Op.ATr'y GEN. Wis., at vii (1965).
60 "The right of the people peaceably to assemble, to consult for the common good,
and to petition the government, or any department thereof, shall never be abridged."
WIs. CONST. art. 1, § 4.

1016

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1004

of government" 61
times. '62

tion regarding the affairs
during public meetings
"open to all citizens at all
It is no answer to allow an individual public employee the rightto speak in his own behalf while denying him, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court did, the right to speak on behalf of the minority union
he represents. It is doubtful that public comment from any source will
undermine the collective bargaining role of the exclusive representative. Moreover, this anomalous policy might violate statutory prohibitions protecting the public employee's right to form, join, assist, or
participate in any union of public employees, or to refrain from such
activity.63 Guarantees implicit in the first amendment freedoms of
speech and association might also be abridged.6 4 Thus, the persuasiveness of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's analysis is questionable.
B.

Presentation o Grievances
Although the individual public employee and his minority union
may be effectively precluded from negotiating the terms of an agreement covering conditions of employment with the public employer,
the constitutional right to seek redress for grievances arising in the
course of public employment under a contract negotiated by the exclusive representative is absolute. 65 However, the guarantees of the
first amendment of the Constitution and of parallel state provisions
support no more than a right to petition the government employer;
the government employer is under no constitutional obligation to redress, negotiate, or adjust the grievance alleged.6 6 Any additional
guarantees for the public employee and the minority union are furnished at the discretion of the state legislatures and the Federal Executive.
At present, the federal executive order 67 and most state statutes
granting exclusive recognition to a majority union reserve the right
of the individual public employee to present grievances concerning the
employment relationship to the public employer on an individual
basis, 68 or to present them through a representative of his own choos61 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 14.90(1) (Supp. 1969).

62
68
64
66
66
67

Id. § 14.90(2).

See notes 22-25 supra.
Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 US. 449, 460-61 (1958).
See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 18-19, 60 supra.
Exec. Order No. 11491, §§ 7(d), 10(e), 13-14, 34 Fed. Reg. 17608, 17610-12 (1969).
68 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468(d) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 1306 (Supp. 1968) (public employees); id. tit. 14, § 4007 (BNA Gov'r
EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 322, F-2 (Nov. 10, 1969)) (teachers); ME.Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
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ing;6 9 some also grant the minority union an independent opportunity
to raise and present grievances. 70
These guarantees are not unqualified, however. The statutes often
provide that any discussion or adjustment of a grievance of an individual public employee-' or of a minority union 72 shall not be incon§

967(2) (Supp. 1970) (municipal employees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 160(h)(3) (1969)
(teachers); BALTimoRE, MD., CIrY CODE art. 1, § 115(c) (BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP.
No. 266, E4 (Oct. 14, 1968)) (municipal employees); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(1), (11)
(1968) (public employees); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1288 (Supp. 1967) (teachers); Ch. 650,
§ 9(2), [1969] Nev. Stat. 1376 (municipal employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp.
1969) (public employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1983 (Supp. 1969) (teachers); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 28.72.050 (Supp. 1969) (teachers); id. § 41.56.080 (public employees).
69 Los ANGELES CouNTY, CAL., EMPLOYEE RELATIONS ORDINANCE, §§ 4, 5, 9 (BNA
Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 261, F-i to -3 (Sept. 9, 1968)) (county employees); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153b(c) (Supp. 1969) (teachers) (But see New Haven Fed'n of Teachers
v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 27 Conn. Supp. 298, 237 A.2d 373 (Super. Ct. 1967)); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 179.52(1) (1966) (public employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:3(II)(a)
(Supp. 1969) (state employees); Nav YoRK Crry, ADmINfLTRE CODE ch. 54, § 1173-10.0(d)
(2 CCH LAB. L. REP.-STATz LAws, N.Y. 47,450 (March 16, 1968)) (municipal employees);
Ch. 579, § 5(l), [1969] Ore. Laws (4A BNA LAB. REL. REP. 47:234b (Oct. 27, 1969))
(public employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-7-12 to -14 (1968) (applicable to teachers
pursuant to id. § 28-9.3-6, to municipal employees pursuant to id. § 28-9.4-7, to policemen,
firefighters, and state employees pursuant to id. § 36-11-6); Ch. 88, §§ 2, 7(1), [1969] S.D.
Laws 154-55 (public employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 926, 941(j)-(k) (Supp. 1969) (state
employees); id. tit. 21, § 1583 (applicable to municipal employees pursuant to id. tit. 21,
§ 1703); Wxs. STAT. ANN. § 111.83(1) (Supp. 1969) (state employees).
Besides the express provisions of the collective bargaining laws, related state statutes
often provide methods for public employees to take up their grievances with their superiors
on an individual basis. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 30, § 53 (1966); E. SunS & C. WHITrmR,
TEACRERs, ADMINIsTRATORs, AND CoLLECrIvE BARGAINING 156 (1968).
70 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153b(c) (Supp. 1969) (teachers); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 179.52(3) (1966) (public employees); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1289 (Supp. 1967) (teachers);
Ch. 650, § 12(2), [1969] Nev. Stat. 1378-79 (municipal employees); Ch. 579, § 5(l), [1969]
Ore. Laws (4A BNA LAB. REL. REP. 47:234(b) (Oct. 27, 1969)) (public employees); Ch. 88,
§ 7(3), [1969] S.D. Laws 156 (public employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1983 (Supp. 1969)
(teachers); id. tit. 3, §§ 926, 941() (state employees); id. fit. 21, § 1583 (applicable to municipal employees pursuant to id. tit. 21, § 1703); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.83(1) (Supp. 1969)
(state employees). See West, The NEA and Collective Negotiations, in READINGs ON COLLEIvE NEGOTIATIONS IN PuBuc EDUCATION 157 (S. Elam, M. Lieberman & M. Moskow eds.
1967). Commentators often regard the opportunity of a minority union to present its
views and grievances to the governing body as "testimony rights" necessary to protect the
interests of the individual employee and minority union where another union negotiates
exclusively. See R. DOHERTY & W. OBERE, supra note 11, at 77; E. SHius & C. WHTTIER,
supra note 69, at 140-41.
71 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468(d) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 1306 (Supp. 1968) (public employees); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 967(2)

(Supp. 1970) (municipal employees); BALTrMORE, Mn., Crry CODE art. 1, § 115(c)
(BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 266, E-4 (Oct. 14, 1968)) (municipal employees); MICH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(1), (11) (1968) (public employees); Ch. 650, § 9(2), [1969] Nev. Stat.
1377 (municipal employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1969) (public employees);
NEw YORK Crry, ADnasRAT=' CODE ch. 54, § 1173-10.0(d)(3) (2 CCH LAB. L. REP.-
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sistent with the terms of any collective bargaining contract or agreement
then in effect. 73 Although the individual public employee may exercise
such rights without the intervention of the exclusive bargaining representative,74 the exclusive representative is granted the opportunity to
be present at any such adjustment,75 or at least at an initial conference.7 6
The limited nature of these statutory "rights" is further illustrated
by the qualifications and interpretations imposed by administrative
tribunals and state courts. For example, the "right" of an individual
employee or minority union to have a grievance adjusted may arise
only where a grievance procedure has been established through negotia47,450 (March 16, 1968)) (municipal employees); Ch. 579, § 5(l)(a),
[1969] Ore. Laws (4A BNA LAB. REL. REP. 47:234b (Oct. 27, 1969)) (public employees);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 941(j) (Supp. 1969) (state employees); id. tit. 21, § 1583 (applicable
to municipal employees pursuant to id. tit. 21, § 1703); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.080
(Supp. 1969) (public employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.83(1) (Supp. 1969) (state employees).
The provisions of the executive order for federal employees have the same effect. Exec.
Order No. 11491, §§ 7(d), 13-14, 34 Fed. Reg. 17608, 17611-12 (1969). See also BlackClauson Co. v. 1AM, 313 F.2d 179, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1962); Labor-Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
72 Ch. 650, § 12(2), [1969] Nev. Stat. 1378-79 (municipal employees); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1969) (public employees); NEw YORK Crry, AD NmwinsrrvE CODE
ch. 54, § 1173-10.0(d)(3) (2 CCH LAB. L. REP.-STATE LAws, N.Y. 47,450 (March 16, 1968))
(municipal employees); Ch. 579, § 5(1)(a), [1969] Ore. Laws (4A BNA LAB. REL. REP.
47:234b (Oct. 27, 1969)) (public employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 941(j) (Supp. 1969) (state
employees); id. tit. 21, § 1583 (applicable to municipal employees pursuant to id. tit. 21,
§ 1703); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.83(1) (Supp. 1969) (state employees).
78 This prohibition may apply only to the grievance procedure agreed to by the
exclusively recognized union and the public employer. See Los ANGmS CoUNTY, CAL.,
EMLOYEE RELATIONS ORDiNANCE § 11(b) (BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REtP. No. 261, F-5
(Sept. 9, 1968)) (county employees).
74 E.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(1), (11) (1968) (public employees); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 3, § 941(j) (Supp. 1969) (state employees); id. tit. 21, § 1583 (applicable to municipal
employees pursuant to id. tit. 21, § 1703); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.080 (Supp. 1969)
(public employees).
75 Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1306 (Supp. 1968) (public employees); BALTIMORE,
MD., CrrY CODE art. 1, § 115(c) (BNA Gov'T EmPLOYEE RE.L. REP. No. 266, E-4 (Oct. 14,
1968)) (municipal employees); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 967(2) (Supp. 1970) (municipal
employees); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(11) (1968) (public employees); Ch. 579, § 5(1)(b),
[1969] Ore. Laws (4A BNA LAB. REL. REP. 47:234b (Oct. 27, 1969)) (public employees);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1583 (Supp. 1969) (applicable to municipal employees pursuant to
id. tit. 21, § 1703); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.83(l) (Supp. 1969) (state employees). For a similar
provision applicable in the private sector, see Labor-Management Relations Act (TaftHartley Act) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
76 E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.080 (Supp. 1969) (public employees). Two
statutes merely provide for prompt notice to the exclusive representative of any meeting
or adjustment of an individual employee's grievance. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468(d)
(Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1969) (public
employees).
STATE LAws, N.Y.
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tions between the public employer and the exclusive representative. 77
Moreover, the language of many of the statutes78 parallels, to some de-gree, the comparable provision in the Labor-Management Relations
Act (LMRA) for the private sector.7 9 The first proviso to section 9(a)
of the LMRA speaks of the "right" of an individual employee or group
of employees (1) to present grievances to the employer and (2) to have
the grievances adjusted without the interference of an exclusive representative, so long as the adjustment is consistent with the terms of a
bargaining agreement then in effect.8 0 The leading judicial interpretation of section 9(a), based upon the relevant statutory history of the
77 See UMW Local I (University of Wis.-Milwaukee), Decision No. 8383 (W.E.R.C.
*Feb. 5, 1968), discussed in BNA Gov'T EmPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 231, B-2 to -3 (Feb. 12,
1968) (interpreting Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.83(1) (Supp. 1969) (state employees)). See also
notes 71-76 and accompanying text supra. This result would be reached in those jurisdictions recognizing an exclusive bargaining representative for public employees, but not
requiring the public employer to bargain collectively with the exclusively recognized
union. See Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g
71 L.R.R.M. 2898 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (holding that absent state law for public employee
collective bargaining, school board had no constitutional duty to bargain with majority
union recognized as exclusive representative); Joint School District No. 8 v. WERB,
37 Wis. 2d 483, 489, 155 N.W.2d 78, 81 (1967) (no duty to bargain collectively
imposed on municipal employer by Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (1967) under which majority
union was recognized as exclusive representative for purpose of collective bargaining). Absent a duty to bargain with the exclusive representative regarding
employment conditions, no right is vested in the minority union to compel a public
employer to adjust or bargain over its grievances. But see Appellant's Brief in Support of
Motion for Rehearing at 7-9, Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d
92 (1969)-(supporting a minority union right to negotiate); Letter from William H. Wilker,
Ass't Att'y Gen. of Wis., to the author, March 12, 1970 (on file, Cornell Law Review).
It should be noted, however, that the inability to have a grievance adjusted does not,
per se, subvert constitutional guarantees; the individual employee or minority union maintains the right, no matter how sterile it may be, to petition its government employer.
U.S. CONSr. amend. I; see notes 18-19, 60, and accompanying text supra.
78 See notes 68-75 and accompanying text supra.
79 Representatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual
employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then
in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1964).
80 For examples of public employment statutes with comparable language, see notes
68-72 and accompanying text supra.
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LMRA,1 states that the first proviso to section 9(a) does not confer
a right on the individual employee to compel compliance with the
negotiated grievance procedure; it merely permits the employee to take
his grievance to the employer without violating the exclusive right of
the designated representative to bargain collectively for all the em82
ployees.
Section 5(1) of the Wisconsin statute applicable to municipal
employees8 3 contains language similar to that in section 9(a) of the
LMRA. However, the proviso to section 5(1) guarantees the grievance
presentation right specifically to "any individual employe or any minority group of employes" 84 whereas the LMRA proviso is addressed to
"any individual employee or a group of employees."8' 5 More important
is a guarantee in the section 5(1) proviso not found in section 9(a) of
the LMRA: "[t]he employer shall confer with them [individual employees or minority groups of employees] in relation thereto [their
grievances]." 8 6 Based on the language distinguishing the Wisconsin law
from the LMRA, WERB has construed section 5(l)'s proviso to limit
the exclusivity of the so-called exclusive representative by creating a
duty of the public employer to confer with an individual employee or
a minority group. 7
Under section 11 of the comparable Michigan statute, 8 as under
See Black-Clawson Co. v. IAM, 313 F.2d 179, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1962). See also LABOR
941-44 (3d ed. J. Williams 1965).
82 l3lack-Clawson Co. v. 1AM, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
It seems clear, therefore, that rather than conferring an indefeasible right upon
the individual employee to compel compliance with the grievance procedure up
to and including any arbitration provision, section 9(a) merely set up a buffer
between the employee and his union, "permitting" the employee to take his
grievances to the employer, and "authorizing" the employer to hear and adjust
them without running afoul of the "exclusive bargaining representative" language
of the operative portion of section 9(a).
Id. at 185 (footnote omitted).
83 Representatives chosen for the purposes of collective bargaining by a majority
of the employes voting in a collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representatives of all of the employes in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining, provided that any individual employe or any minority group of
employes in any collective bargaining unit shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer in person or through representatives of their
own choosing, and the employer shall confer with them in relation thereto.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.05(l) (1957) (emphasis added) (applicable to municipal employees
pursuant to id. § 111.70(4)(d) (Supp. 1969)).
84 Id. § 111.05(l) (1957) (emphasis added).
85 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964) (emphasis added); see note 79 supra.
88 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.05(1) (1957) (emphasis added).
87 Milwaukee Teachers Union, Decision No. 6995-A, at 18-19 (W.E.R.B. March 24,
1966), rev'd in part sub nom. Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d
92 (1969). See id. at 23 (concurring opinion of Arvid Anderson, Commissioner).
88 Representatives designated or selected for purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the public employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
81
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section 9(a) of the LMRA, no right to process his own grievance inures
to an individual public employee. However, the Michigan law eliminates the LMRA reference to "group of employees," thereby permitting
a construction that minority unions have no mandatory rights in the
grievance area. Moreover, in connection with the individual's presentation of a grievance and the employer's adjustment thereof, the permissive word "may" is incorporated into the Michigan law whereas the
LMRA employs the phrase "shall have the right." Referring to the
result reached under the LMRA, 9 the Michigan Labor Mediation
Board has construed section 11 to be "no more than a grant of immunity to an employer against being charged with a refusal to bargain
. . . in the event the employer voluntarily chooses to listen to and
adjust an employee's grievance . . .,0
Application of the experiences under the LMRA as well as under
the Wisconsin and Michigan statutes may be necessary to determine
the proper scope of public employment legislation reserving a right
for the individual public employee or the minority union to present
grievances to the public employer for adjustment. 91 Unless the statutory
language in the remaining states compels a result similar to that in Wisconsin, it would appear that sound labor relations policy supports an
application to the public sector of the restrictive Michigan or LMRA
approach.9 2 A denial of the grievance procedure to the minority union
representative is necessary to prevent use of tha procedure as a vehicle
for rival union activity, rather than for the processing of legitimate
93
employee grievances.
shall be the exdusive representatives of all the public employees in such a unit

for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment or other conditions of employment, and shall be so recognized by

the public employer: Provided, That any individual employee at any time may
present grievances to his employer and have the grievances adjusted, without intervention of the bargaining representative, if the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of a collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect, provided

that the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at
such adjustment.
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(11) (1968) (emphasis added).
89 See notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra.
90 Avondale School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1967 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. 680, 687 (trial

examiner's opinion). Accord, New Haven Fed'n of Teachers v. New Haven Bd. of
Educ., 27 Conn. Supp. 298, 313-15, 237 A.2d 373, 380-81 (Super. Ct. 1967) (construing CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153b(c) (1967)).
91 See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra. The Connecticut statute for teachers
has been given a construction that accords with the Michigan approach. Note 90 supra.
92 To date, the only jurisdictions that have judicially considered the application of

a provision for individual presentation of grievances are Michigan, Wisconsin, and Connecticut.
93 See Black-Clawson Co. v. IAM, 313 F.2d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 1962); Hughes Tool Co.
v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 74 (5th Cir. 1945); Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp.
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In those cases in which the minority union or individual public
employee is permitted to process a grievance beyond the petitioning
stage, certain restrictions may still be imposed. Thus, a public employer
agreeing to process the grievance of an individual public employee
may condition its assent upon the presentation of the employee's complaint by the employee alone or with the assistance of counsel agreed
to or provided by the exclusive bargaining representative." Presentation of the employee's grievance at a formal hearing by representatives
of a minority union may be strictly prohibited. 5 This position has a
legal basis in the provision that adjustment of an individual employee's
grievance may not be inconsistent with the terms of any contract, agreement, or grievance procedure then in effect between the public employer and the exclusive representative.9 6 If such agreement provides
that the negotiated grievance procedure shall be the only procedure,
the individual employee would be limited to representation by the
exclusive representative or its agent, if he wishes representation at all.
At least one state law has been construed in this way,9 7 and a similar
result may be reached under Executive Order No. 11491. Section 7
(d)(1) of the executive order provides that recognition of an exclusive
representative does not preclude a federal employee in the bargaining
unit "from choosing his own representative in a grievance . . . ac-

tion." 98 However, section 13, which grants the exclusive representative the right to negotiate a grievance procedure, provides that
a negotiated procedure "is .

.

. exclusive .

.

. when the agreement so

provides." 99 Thus, section 13 appears to detract from the individual's
right under section 7(d) of the executive order; if an agreement promulgating an employee grievance procedure so provides, the federal
employee may be denied representation by an agent of the minority
782, 790-91 (D. Md. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960).
See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) (dictum).
94 See New Haven Fed'n of Teachers v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 27 Conn. Supp. 298,
314-15, 237 A2d 373, 380-81 (Super. Ct. 1967); Avondale School Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
1967 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. 680, 684, 688-89 (trial examiner's opinion). But see Milwaukee
Teachers Union, Decision No. 6995-A, at 7 ( 5), 19 (W.E.R.B. March 24, 1966), rev'd in
part sub nom. Board of School Dirs. v. WERO, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969).
95 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3(c) (Supp. 1969) (public employees); NEwv YORK
Crry, ADMINisTRATIVE CODE ch. 54, § 1173-10.0(d) (2 CCH LAB. L. REP.-STATE LAWS, N.Y.
47,450.15 (March 15, 1968)) (municipal employees). Contra, 1 PERB
1-531 (April 2,
1968) (opinion of counsel).
96 See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
97 See Avondale School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1967 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. 680.
98 34 Fed. Reg. 17608 (1969).
99 Id. at 17611.
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union. The policy basis supporting this interpretation parallels that
favoring a restrictive right to grievance adjustment. 10 0
Although the public employee may be limited in his choice of
grievance representatives, he is protected from arbitrary or discriminatory treatment if he chooses to utilize counsel provided by the exclusive
representative.' 0 ' Even if there is no remedy under the public employment bargaining law for an employee whose exclusive representative
refuses to process his grievance, 0 2 he may have an independent constitutional,0 3 judicial, or statutory'0 4 basis for action.
C.

Other Contractual Privileges

Collective bargaining between the exclusive representative and
the public employer may result in a grant of other contractual privileges to the exclusive representative that do not inure to the benefit
of the minority union. These may include union security provisions,
dues deduction (check-off) provisions, provisions for compensable absences, and provisions governing access to the employees' work place.
The propriety and legality of alloting such privileges on an exclusive
basis merit discussion.
1. The Check-Off and Union Security. The check-off is one
method by which a labor organization can maintain some degree of
organizational security. 10 5 It has already been suggested that an exclusive check-off provision in public employment runs afoul of the fourteenth amendment. 0 6 Yet, the federal executive order 0 7 and several
10 See text at note 93 supra.
1o See U.S. Civil Service Conm'n Bull. No. 711-8 (Aug. 4, 1965), in LABoR-MANAGE-

173 (H. Roberts ed. 1968) (construing § 6(b) of
Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Comp.), a provision left substantially
unchanged by its successor, Exec. Order No. 11491, § 10(e), 34 Fed. Reg. 17610 (1969));
notes 30, 42, and accompanying text supra.
102 See Board of Educ. (J. Carl Stanley), 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. 621, 623 (trial
examiner's opinion).
103 See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944).
1o4 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (describing the rules applicable to the private
sector). Cf. Lullo v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 55 NJ. 409, 262 A.2d 681 (1970)
(citing Vaca).
105 A check-off provision is a form of union security involving a deduction by the
employer of union dues from an employee's wages, usually upon the employee's express
authorization. The amounts so deducted are paid over to the union. Bauch v. City of New
York, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 603 n.1, 237 N.E.2d 211, 212 n.1, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951, 952 n.1, cert.
denied, 393 U.S 834 (1968); LaoR LAw GROUP TRUST, supra note 81, at 635.
108 See text at note 37 supra. See also BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 319,
B-17 (Oct. 20, 1969) (reporting a constitutional challenge of the exclusive check-off provision
in Baltimore).
107 Exec. Order No. 11491, § 21(a), 34 Fed. Reg. 17614 (1969) (enabling only a union
MENT RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE
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states' 08 provide for an exclusive check-off privilege upon written authorization by unit employees. 109 Despite vigorous arguments supporting the unconstitutionality of such provisions in public employment," 0
New York courts have upheld exclusive check-off provisions,"' and
the Supreme Court has refused to review the problem. 1112
Although it may be reasonable to sustain the constitutionality of
an exclusive dues deduction privilege, one state supreme court has recognized the statutory invalidity of a negotiated provision denying a
minority union the check-off right granted the exclusive representative. 118 In Board of School Directors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,114 the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with a
minority union assertion that if the municipal employer grants the
check-off privilege, it must be granted equally to minority and exclusive
representatives. 115
The court was concerned with the impact of an exclusive check-off
on the statutorily protected 1 6 rights of municipal employees to freely
exclusively recognized under the executive order to negotiate for the check-off privilege);
see BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE RE.. RIEP. No. 330, A-i (Jan. 5, 1970).
108 Public employees: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1311 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. CrV. SEav.
LAw § 208(b) (McKinney Supp. 1969), as interpreted in Bauch v. City of New York,
21 N.Y.2d 599, 237 N.E.2d 211, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.110 (Supp. 1969).
109 Other jurisdictions merely permit the public employer to check-off union dues of
any labor organization of public employees. Los ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., EMPLOYEE REr.LATONS ORDINANCE, §§ 10(b), 12(a)(2) (DNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. RE'. No. 261, F-7 (Sept.
9, 1968)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4003(c) (BNA GOv'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 322, F-i
(Nov. 10, 1969)) (teachers); BALTIMORE, MD., CrY CODE art. 1, § 120 (BNA Gov'r EMPLOYEE
RE.. REzP. No. 266, E-6 (Oct. 14, 1968)) (municipal employees); N.H. RFv. STAT. ANN.
§ 98-C:8(IV) (Supp. 1969) (state employees); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-14-3 (1968) (applicable to policemen, firefighters, and state employees pursuant to id. § 36-11-6 (1969));
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees), as construed in Board of
School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 649-50, 168 N.W.2d 92, 98 (1969).
110 See Appellants' Brief at 11-24, and Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court
of Appeals of the State of New York at 16-20, 23-28, Bauch v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.2d
599, 237 N.E.2d 211, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1968).
111 Bauch v. City of New York, 54 Misc. 2d 343, 282 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct.), afJ'd, 28
App. Div. 2d 1209, 285 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1st Dep't 1967), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 237 N.E.2d 211,
289 N.Y.S.2d 951, cert. denied, 893 U.S. 834 (1968). See also Kugler v. City of New York,
73 L.R.R.M. 2478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 1970). New York is the only jurisdiction that has
considered the constitutionality of an exclusive check-off privilege.
112 Bauch v. City of New York, 393 U.S. 834 (1968).
118 Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969).
114 Another aspect of this case is discussed at notes 47-64 and accompanying text
supra.

115 42 Wis. 2d at 648-50, 168 N.W.2d at 97-98.
116.WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(3)(a) (Supp. 1969) prohibits a municipal employer from:
1. Interfering with, restraining or coercing any municipal employe in the
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join or refrain from joining any labor organization. It therefore adopted
a WERB-suggested test to determine whether the restrictive grant had
so discriminated in favor of the exclusive representative that minority
union membership was in effect discouraged:
"Those rights or benefits which are granted exclusively to the
majority representative,and thus denied to minority organizations,
must in some rationalmanner be related to the functions of the
majority organization in its representative capacity, and must not
be granted to entrench such organization as the bargaining representative." 17
Applying this standard, the court held that granting an exclusive
check-off provision was a prohibited practice under the state statute." 8
In so doing it implied that an exclusive check-off was unrelated to the
majority union's bargaining function and that the "self-perpetuation
and entrenchment"1 9 fostered by such a check-off might act to deter
membership in other unions.
The Wisconsin approach may be attractive in jurisdictions with
similar statutes protecting both aspects of organizational rights-the
right to join and the right to refrain from joining a labor organization.2 0 To the extent that the determination of the validity of an
exclusive check-off in public employment depends upon an interpretation of these protected rights, it appears that the threshold problem is
the formulation of a relevant public policy.
In the private sector the exclusive check-off privilege is commonplace. But in the public sector, the state is acting both as employer
121
and in its traditional public role as regulator of labor relations policy.
Thus, the state should be particularly sensitive to the privileges it
grants an exclusive majority representative acting solely for the purpose of collective bargaining with the public employer. If, indeed, the
exercise of the rights provided in sub. (2) [to join or to refrain from joining a
labor organization].
2. Encouraging or discouraging membership in any labor organization ...

by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure or other terms or conditions of
employment.
117 42 Wis. 2d at 649, 168 N.W.2d at 97 (emphasis in original), quoting Milwaukee Bd.
of School Dirs., Decision No. 6833-A, at 8 (W.E.R.B. March 24, 1966).
118 42 Wis. 2d at 650, 168 N.W.2d at 98.
119 Id.. at 649, 168 N.W.2d at 98. Contra, Bauch v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.2d 599,
237 N.E.2d 211, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968).
120 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153a (1967) (teachers); ME. R v. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, §§ 963, 967(2) (Supp. 1970) (municipal empyloyees); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149,
§ 178D (Supp. 1969) (state employees); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1969) (public
employees); N.Y. Crv. SEav. LAW §§ 202, 209-a(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1969) (public

employees).
121 See Eisner, supra note 13, at 442.
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denial of a check-off privilege contributes little or nothing-except that
it makes the collection of minority union dues relatively more difficult' 2 2-to

the stability of the collective bargaining relationship estab-

lished between the public employer and the exclusive representative, a
rational labor relations policy need not support an exclusive check-off
privilege. And if the end sought is the destruction or dissolution of the
123
minority union, it is indeed improper.
Whether or not the exclusive check-off is considered a modified or
minimum form of union security arrangement, 12 4 it appears to be unrelated to the policies supporting an extension of the traditional provisions for union security12 5 to the public sector. Adoption of a union
security arrangement helps to achieve a degree of financial and organizational security necessary to enhance union responsibility. 12 6 The
traditional forms of union security prevent the nonunion employee
from sharing in the benefits resulting from the activities of the exclusive bargaining representative without also sharing in the obligations.
In the private sector, an awareness of the "free rider" problem has been
met by requiring that each employee pay his fair share of the costs of
bargaining and contract administration. 12 7 Where, in fact, there is
exclusive recognition of a majority union, the policy favoring the imposition of a fair financial burden on the nonmember seems equally
justified in public employment. 28 But inasmuch as the check-off is
122 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York at 7-8, Bauch v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 237 N.E.2d 211, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951
(1968).
123 See note 120 and accompanying text supra. See also Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York at 9, 16-17, Bauch v. City of
New York, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 237 N.E.2d 211, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1968).
Contrary to the above expressed views are those of two presidential review commissions
that recognized the value of the exclusive check-off in producing stable labor-management

relations in the federal service. See

LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE,

supra note 101, at 25; BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 280, A-2 (Jan. 20, 1969).
124 See Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 649 n.4, 168 N.W.2d 92, 98
n.4 (1969).
125 E.g., closed shop, union shop, modified union shop, maintenance of membership,
and agency shop. See LABOR LAW GROUP TRUST, supra note 81, at 633-35; Hopfl, The
Agency Shop Question, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 478 (1964).
126 See Gromfine, Union Security Clauses in Public Employment, in BNA GOV'T
EMPLOYEE RxL. REI'. No. 304, E-1 to -2 (July 7, 1969).
127 See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); IAM v. Street, 367 U.S.

740 (1961).
128 A union security agreement, unlike a denial of check-off equality to the minority
organization, stabilizes the collective bargaining relationship by providing security from
attack by rivals and enables the exclusive representative to devote more attention to collective bargaining and the administration of collective agreements.
The militancy displayed by public employee unions often results from defending
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merely a convenience guaranteeing the orderly collection of dues by the
respective union, such policies are not advanced by an exclusive checkoff arrangement.
If some form of union security arrangement is negotiated by the
exclusive representative of public employees, it is not objectionable so
long as: (1) it is legally permissible, 129 and (2) it has as its primary purpose the enhancement of peaceful and productive labor relations in the
public sector rather than mere discrimination against employees because of minority union membership. 1 0 An exclusive check-off arrangement does not fulfill the latter requirement. If the check-off is granted
an exclusive representative, it should be made equally available to a
rival minority union.
2. Access to the Employment Premises and Related Preferences.
Agreements that exceed the bounds of permissible cooperation between
the exclusive representative and the employer may arise concerning
access to employment premises and facilities granted exclusively to the
recognized majority union. It has been suggested that exclusive access
to the physical facilities of the work premises for communication purposes may be constitutionally objectionable. 13 1 The public employer
may, however, condition the use of or access to such facilities upon
compliance with reasonable regulations. 3 2 Constitutional and statutory
themselves against organizational attacks by rival unions. See Oberer, supra note
11, at 781.. A strike situation is as much a product of the union's lack of
strength, inability to maintain effective control over the employees it represents, and need
to develop a sense of solidarity as it is of the union's assertion of economic strength after
reaching a substantive impasse at the bargaining table. See Gromfine, supra note 126, at
E-1.
129 In private employment the right to bargain for a dosed shop is generally prohibited. E.g., 29 US.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964); 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964). Inasmuch as the union
shop permitted by the Taft-Hariey Act conditions continued employment solely on the
payment of union dues and fees, the agency shop is the practical equivalent of the union
shop. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.. 734, 744 (1963). In balancing the security
and financial support necessary to sustain an exclusive bargaining representative with a
consideration for the freedom of an individual employee, it appears that the agency shop
may be the best union security alternative for public employment. See Oberer, supra note
11, at 781-82. For a discussion of the legality and desirability of union security, especially
the agency shop, in public employment, see Comment, Impact of the Agency Shop on
Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 55 ComELL L. Rv. 547 (1970).
130 See Wallace Corp. v. NLR.B, 323 U.S. 248, 256 (1944).
131 Note 35 and accompanying text supra.
132 See, e.g., 2 PERB
2-5009 (June 3, 1969) (opinion of counsel); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 16, § 2002 (Supp. 1969) (teachers):
The school board shall permit teachers, administrators, and their respective
organizations access at reasonable times to areas in which teachers and administrators work, and to use institutional bulletin boards, mail boxes, or other communication media subject to reasonable regulation by the school board, and to
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protections afforded the individual employee or his minority union are
satisfied where the use of such facilities has been accorded the exclusively recognized union to enable it to perform its function as
the designated collective bargaining representative. 1 33 Whether the
exclusive use of such facilities is granted unilaterally by the public
employer'3 4 or through collective bargaining with the exclusive representative, 35 this standard must be met.
It would not appear to be unlawful discrimination for the public
employer to provide adequate space in its facilities solely for the use
of the exclusive representative for executive sessions and caucuses during active negotiations. If an exclusive representative is properly to
represent employees in the processing of their grievances, it should
have the opportunity to discuss the grievances with the employees involved at convenient times and places. Similarly, sole use of the internal
mail system and bulletin boards granted the exclusive representative
for such purposes would not unlawfully entrench the majority union
or discriminate against a minority organization . 3
Related to the practice of permitting the exclusive use of facilities
for bargaining purposes is the policy of compensating an employee
acting as agent of the exclusive representative during working hours.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, provision for time off with pay
granted exclusively to an officer of the recognized majority union
to allow him to negotiate or conduct bargaining unit business would
not be improper.13 7 The denial of a comparable privilege to an ofuse school facilities at reasonable times for the purpose of meetings concerned
with the exercise of rights guaranteed by this chapter.
133 See Avondale School Dist. Bd. of Educ. (Avondale Fed'n of Teachers), 1968 Mich.
L.M.B. Ops. 518, 525 (trial examiner's opinion); Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors,
Decision No. 6833-A, at 2-3 (W.E.R.B. March 24, 1966) (declaratory ruling), rev'd in
part sub noma. Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969).
184 See U.S. Civil Service System, Federal Personnel Manual, System Letter No. 711-6
(Dec. 14, 1966) (under Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Comp.)), in
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE PuBLic SExvicE, supra note 101, at 154.
2-5009 (June 3, 1969) (opinion of counsel).
135 See 2 PER1
136 See Avondale School Dist. Bd. of Educ. (Avondale Fed'n of Teachers), 1968 Mich.
L.M.B. Ops. 518, 525 (trial examiner's opinion): "Such conveniences help the exclusive
representative to communicate with the people it represents. This is essential to good
representation."
1-514 (Jan. 22, 1967) (opinion of counsel). This is in contrast to a
37 See 1 PERB
negotiated paid-leave for attendance at the state convention of the exclusive teacher
representative; denial of a similar privilege to attend the minority teacher union's convention constitutes discrimination unrelated to the employment relationship and the
obligation of the exclusive bargaining representative to serve the interests of all the
employees. See Raymond Kovala, Decision No. 8708-B (W.E.R.C. May 14, 1969), discussed in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 298, B-7 (May 26, 1969). However, there
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ficial of a minority union would not unlawfully discriminate for the
prohibited purpose of discouraging union membership under statutes
protecting the right of public employees to form and join labor or13 9
ganizations 138 or to refrain from such activity.

The analysis concerning provision for the right to process grievances or the use of facilities to perform the bargaining function should
also serve as a standard governing the exclusive representative in its
performance of other services on behalf of the public employees in the
bargaining unit. Thus, permission to conduct a membership meeting
on the work premises cannot be considered as falling within the area
of the protected privilege of exclusivity if the meeting concerns the
internal affairs of the union. If the meeting is called in order to develop
bargaining demands and strategy, however, the majority union is entitled to the exclusive use of the premises. The exclusive use of bulletin
boards and the internal mail system for purposes unrelated to the
majority union's function as the bargaining representative of all the
employees in the unit could likewise be considered unlawful discrimination not properly within the privilege of exclusivity. 140
The approach suggested regarding exclusive access to facilities
may not apply to a related area-access to information and records
concerning the public employer and the public employees. In private
employment, where there is an enforceable duty upon the employer
to bargain with the majority representative, the employer has a duty
to furnish to the representative, upon request, pertinent data with
respect to the identity of employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit, 141 as well as data relating to wages, hours, and conditions of
may be no obligation to grant teachers time off to attend a minority union convention
on days other than those established in the school calendar by the public employer and
the exclusive representative. See Kenosha Teachers Union, Decision No. 8120 (W.E.R.C.
Aug. 3, 1967); Wisconsin Fed'n of Teachers (Joint School Dist. No. 8), Decision No.
7910-B (W.E.R.C. Aug. 3, 1967); Wisconsin Fed'n of Teachers (Milwaukee Ed. of School
Dirs.), Decision No. 7906-B (W.E.R.C. Aug. 3, 1967).
138 See City of Detroit (Detroit City Hosp. Employees), 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. 798,
806 (trial examiner's opinion) (construing MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(9), (10)(a), (10)(c)

(1968)).
1S9 Compare N.Y. Civ. SExv. LAw §§ 202, 209-a(l), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1969), with
1 PERB
1-514 (Jan. 22, 1967) (opinion of counsel).
140 See Milwaukee Teachers Union (Milwaukee Ed. of School Dirs.), Decision No.
9258, at 8-4 (W.E.R.C. Oct. 8, 1969) (this case is the most recent WERC pronouncement
on this subject; letter to the author from H. Bellman, WERC Mediator, March 6,
1970) (on file, Cornell Law Review); U.S. Civil Service Comm'n, Federal Personnel Manual,
System Letter No. 711-6 (Dec. 4, 1966), in LABOR-MANAGEmENT RELATIONS IN THE PuLC
SmvicE, supra note 101, at 156.
141 Cf. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767-69 (1969).
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employment. 14

The majority representative in the private sector has
the right to such information in order to carry out its duties as the
exclusive bargaining representative.
In public employment, on the other hand, the names, addresses,
salaries, and working conditions of public employees are, for the most
part, a matter of public record. 148 Under such conditions, a public
employer appears obligated to grant a union representing the interests
of a minority of the public employees in an appropriate unit access
to public records. 144 However, if certain information is not otherwise
available for public inspection, the majority union should have exclusive access to such information or lists of employees when necessary
in the performance of its function as designated collective bargaining
145
representative.
CONCLUSION

Exclusive recognition for a majority union is compatible with
the existence of minority unions in public employment; however,
the special public environment within which these opposing organizations act makes it necessary to stress the rights of the union representing a minority of the employees in a public unit. To protect the
organizational integrity of the minority union it becomes necessary
142 See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 US. 432 (1967); Whitin Mach. Works, 108
N.L.R.B. 1537, 1538 (1954). Cf. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith,71 HAxv. L. Rxv.
1401, 1427 (1958).
143 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 18.01 (1967).
144 Board of School Dirs. v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 655 ge n.6, 168 N.W.2d 92, 101 &
n.5 (1969).
145 Id. at 655-56, 168 N.W.2d at 100-01. But cf. Los ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS ORDINANCE § 9 (BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 261, F-5 (Sept. 9, 1968))
(guaranteeing the right of minority organizations to certain information necessary in
challenging the exclusive representative's majority status); Us. Civil Service Comm'n,
Federal Personnel Manual, System Letter No. 711-8 (Aug. 2, 1967), in LABoR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE, supra note 101, at 160.
Related to the issues of access to facilities and information is the problem of solicitation on the employment premises of membership or dues. Those statutes, regulations,
and cases dealing with the subject have recognized the equal rights of the exclusive and
minority unions in this regard so long as such solicitation is done during the non-duty
hours of the employees concerned and in such a way that there is no interference with
the work of the public employer. See Exec. Order No. 11491, § 20, 34 Fed. Reg.
17614 (1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4009 (BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 322,
F-3 (Nov. 10, 1969)); BALTIMORE, MD., CIY CODE art. I, § 123 (BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL.
REP. No. 266, E-7 (Oct. 14, 1968)). See also Bloomfield Hills Ed. of Educ., 1968 Mich.
L.M.B. Ops. 591, 604-05; Avondale School Dist. Ed. of Educ., 1968 Mich. L.M.B.
Ops. 518, 519. But see New Haven Fed'n of Teachers v. New Haven Ed. of Educ., 27
Conn. Supp. 298, 237 A.2d 373 (Super. Ct. 1967).

1970]
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to circumscribe the powers or benefits enjoyed by the exclusively
recognized union within the context of its duty to act as representative
of all the employees for the purposes of collective bargaining and
contract administration. Beyond the right to negotiate and reach
final agreement afforded the exclusive representative by the applicable
bargaining statute, a minority organization should receive treatment
equal to that accorded the exclusive union.
Protection of the rights of minority unions outside the exclusive
bargaining relationship may not, however, ensure a viable minority
union movement in public employment. Although there is evidence
that keen competition may result between the exclusive and minority
1 institutional
organizations where there are adequate protections, 46
47
pressures' may force competing public employee organizations to
14
merge their efforts and resources.
A trend toward the merger of rival majority and minority unions
of public employees appears to be in its early stages but is, as yet, insignificant. 149 The merger movement does represent a recognition on
146 See BNA Gov'T EmpLOYEE R.L. Rrp. No. 322, B-3 (Nov. 10, 1969).
147 One such pressure, besides the self-perpetuating power that the exclusive representative benefits from, inheres in various statutory "bars" to certification elections in
units of public employees. Executive Order No. 11491, § 7(c), 34 Fed. Reg. 17608 (1969),
for example, precludes a new election in a federal unit for a 12 month period. See also
the proposed regulations under Exec. Order No. 11491, in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL.
Rn'. No. 328, E-1 (Dec. 22, 1969); id. No. 338, A-7 to -8 (March 2, 1970).
State statutes, and regulations established thereunder, also provide more sophisticated
contract "bars" reflecting problems peculiar to public employment. See City of Grand
Rapids (Michigan Nurses Ass'n), 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. 194, 199-200 (the statutory bar to
an election where there is in force and effect a valid collective bargaining agreement was

expanded to preclude circulation of an election petition for a 30-day period pending
action by a legislative body on a complete, written negotiated agreement.) New York State
operates under a unique "bar" formula-incorporating a statutory certification bar with a
contract bar-that is primarily dependent upon the budgetary submission dates of the
particular public employer. N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAW § 208(c) (McKinney Supp. 1969).See 2
PERB 2-5005 (1969) (comment with respect to unchallenged representation status under
§ 208(c)).
Although such absolute "bars" to representation or decertification elections help
entrench the majority union and present formidable obstacles to rival union efforts at
displacing the exclusive representative, one regulatory body has suspended the statutory
contract bar where there was substantial evidence of employee unrest and dissatisfaction
with the bargaining representative. See City of Springfield (Springfield Educ. Ass'n) (Mass.
L.R.C. Jan. 30, 1970), discussed in BNA Gov'T E PLOYEE R.L. REP. No. 338, B-6 to -7
(March 2, 1970) (decision was based on qualifying language of MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149,
§ 178H(3) (Supp. 1969), providing for no election during term of contract except for
"good cause.") But see R. DOHERTY & W. OBEER, supra note 11, at 79, 80 (supporting a
strict two-year certification bar and one-year election bar).
148 See Oberer, supra note 11, at 782.
149 See BNA Gov'T EmpLoYEE REL. REP. No. 335, B-11 (Feb. 9, 1970) (reporting
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the part of the minority and majority unions that a stronger and more
unified front is needed in order to better represent the interests of
the public employee before the government employer. Moreover, it
reflects the interests of the minority union in securing a greater degree
of representational rights within the exclusive relationship. Inasmuch
as the merger trend will not affect the existing representational scheme
for some time, however, a "bargaining relationship" standard should
be deferred to in assessing the relative rights of the exclusive and minority unions.*
Jay W. Waks
merger of civil service unions in New Jersey); id. No. 334, B-8 (Feb. 2, 1970) (reporting
merger of teacher organizations in Los Angeles); id. No. 319, B-12 (Oct. 20, 1969)
(reporting the merger of two local affiliates of rival national teacher unions in Flint,
Michigan). But see id. No. 337, B-14 (Feb. 23, 1970) (reporting recent merger activity by
teacher groups, especially by the rival national organizations, and the ban imposed by
the American Federation of Teachers on further local mergers with affiliates of the
National Education Association).
* In addition to the jurisdictions already providing for exclusive representation
(note 2 supra), Idaho and Kansas have recently made commitments to the principle.
Ch. 138, § 3, [1970] Idaho Laws (BNA Gov'r EMPLOYEE REL. REP'. No. 343, F-2 (April
6, 1970)) (firefighters); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 72-5411, as amended in BNA Gov~r EMPLOYEE
RE.L. RaP. No. 343, G-1 (April 6, 1970) (teachers). One additional state merely requires
the employer to recognize the majority union as representative of the employment interests of all unit employees. ALAsKA STAT. § 14.20.560(a) (BNA Gov'r EMPLOYEE REL. RaP.
No. 345, G-1 (April 20, 1970)) (teachers). Of the recent statutes only Kansas's mentions the
rights of public employees to join, form, or assist a labor organization, or to refrain
from such activities. See the discussion of the relevance of these guarantees, text at notes
21-25, 63 supra.
With regard to the presentation of grievances, the Alaska and Kansas statutes
specifically guarantee no more than the Federal Constitution. See text at note 66 supra.
The Kansas statute enables the individual teacher to present grievances and proposals
to the board of education or its executives. The Alaska law merely reserves this right
for the individual teacher. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra. Moreover,
the posture of the Alaska law is similar to that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Board of School Directorsv. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission-the individual
teacher, only acting in his individual capacity, may address the school board. See text
at notes 47-64 supra.

